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The EU Emissions Trading Directive: Opportunities and 
Potential Pitfalls  
Joseph Kruger and William A. Pizer  
Abstract  
The European Union is on the verge of establishing an emissions trading program 
ten times the size of the Acid Rain trading program in the United States. Its design takes 
advantage of many lessons from existing experience with trading programs, as well as 
economic theory, and innovates in important ways. While we view this as an impressive 
development, concerns about equity, enforcement, and efficiency remain. Specifically, a 
lack of data and weaker environmental institutions in some EU Member States raises 
questions about both allowance allocations and compliance and enforcement. Although 
much attention has focused on whether prices will be “too low” in the first phase of the 
program, a greater risk is that uncertainty about program elements, technology and 
behavioral response, and external events could create volatile markets and costly 
compliance in the second phase. Regardless of outcome, the EU trading system will be 
influential in future international efforts to reduce greenhouse gases.  
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 The EU Emissions Trading Directive:  
Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls 
Joseph Kruger and William A. Pizer∗ 
1. Introduction 
Almost a decade has passed since the United States began operating the first large-scale 
emissions trading program in 1995. The SO2 cap-and-trade program has been studied extensively 
and has become the benchmark for evaluating subsequent emissions trading proposals. Based on 
the success of this “Grand Policy Experiment”1, emissions trading has become an increasingly 
accepted approach for addressing air emissions.  
Beginning in 2005, however, Europe will launch a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) that is substantially larger and more complex than the pioneering U.S. effort. 
Although strongly influenced by the design of the U.S. SO2 trading program (Delbeke, 2003), the 
EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) will dwarf existing U.S. trading programs in size and 
complexity and will encompass a variety of new features. Because of its size, scope, and multi-
jurisdictional political structure—and because it is the first large-scale attempt to regulate 
greenhouse gases—the EU program is in many ways the “New Grand Policy Experiment.” As 
such, it has the opportunity to advance the role of market-based policies in environmental 
regulation and to form the basis for future European and international climate change policies. 
For example, the EU ETS will be the first emissions trading program to grapple with the many 
issues associated with linking different domestic emissions trading programs. Yet there are also 
many pitfalls along the way and, should it not work out as planned—or, worse yet, outright 
                                                 
∗ Kruger and Pizer are, respectively, Visiting Scholar and Fellow at Resources for the Future. We are grateful to 
Dallas Burtraw, Reid Harvey, Bill Irving, Jurgen Lefevere, Richard Morgenstern, and Peter Zapfel for their valuable 
comments. 
1 This term was coined by Stavins (1998) in his assessment of the U.S. SO2 Trading Program. 
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fail—it could set back both efforts to advance market-based policies and to address global 
climate change.  
This paper has three purposes: to summarize key features of European Union Emissions 
Trading Directive, to assess these features against other existing programs and the economic 
literature on market-based policy design, and to draw conclusions about key opportunities and 
pitfalls. All of this is with an eye toward helping current and future policymakers design more 
successful policies. The paper will begin with a description of the program and will compare key 
design elements to those in U.S. SO2 and NOx cap-and-trade programs and to benchmarks 
discussed in the economic literature. Next, we will examine some of the unique implementation 
challenges faced by the EU ETS as it goes from a written blueprint to an operating cap-and-trade 
program. In particular, we will explore the issues associated with implementing an emissions 
trading program that is significantly more decentralized than past efforts in the United States. We 
will evaluate the most recent economic analysis of the EU ETS and will assess some of the cost 
uncertainties faced by EU Member States and their industries. Finally, we will conclude with 
observations about the prospects of the EU ETS along with key opportunities and pitfalls.  
In brief, we see the EU ETS as an impressive political and institutional development 
taking advantage of many lessons gleaned from past market-based policies while innovating to 
address the unique multijurisdictional nature of the EU. Perhaps the most significant challenges 
faced by the EU Member States are the tight timetable they have given themselves to implement 
the trading program and the uncertainties surrounding the future international climate regime. 
Moreover, issues of equity and enforcement raised by the design of the EU ETS are particularly 
difficult in countries with weaker environmental institutions. Allocation, for example, may be 
difficult in the absence of dependable data on historical emissions, fuel use, and output. 
Enforcement may be difficult in Member States, particularly among Accession Countries, that 
have less experience with environmental regulation. Although the EU has harmonized 
enforcement provisions to an unprecedented degree through common penalties and emissions 
measurement guidelines, further harmonization may be necessary to ensure a level playing field 
for emissions trading. The program is well designed with respect to efficiency except that 
considerable uncertainty remains about implementation, technology and behavioral response, 
and external events. This could lead to considerable volatility in allowance markets and 
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extremely expensive efforts to meet the cap. Such concerns could be alleviated through the 
penalty mechanism if nations choose to use this as an effective “safety valve” on the system. 
Like all new, major initiatives the risks and rewards are quite high. Our view is that the EU ETS 
has in its framework all the elements of a successful program, but it is unclear whether it can be 
pieced together on schedule and whether a variety of uncertainties will allow European industry 
to plan effectively.  
2. Summary of Provisions 
The EU program will begin on January 1, 2005, and apply to 25 countries, including the 
10 Accession Countries that will enter the EU in May 2004. The program is to be implemented 
in multiyear phases. The first phase will run from 2005 until 2007 and is sometimes referred  
to by EU officials as a “warm-up” phase (Runge-Metger, 2003). The second phase will begin  
in 2008 and continue through 2012, coinciding with the five-year Kyoto compliance period.  
The program continues in five-year phases thereafter. Following is a brief description of the 
main elements of the EU ETS.2 A more thorough analysis of key elements will follow later in  
the paper.  
2.1 Emissions and Sectors Covered  
Initially, the EU ETS will cover only CO2 emissions from four broad sectors: production 
and processing of iron and steel, minerals (such as cement, glass, or ceramic production) energy 
(such as, electric power, direct emissions from oil refineries), and pulp and paper. Installations3 
are included in the program if they exceed industry-specific production or capacity thresholds 
                                                 
2 There are a variety of other provisions in the EU Directive that are not addressed in this paper, including an “opt-
out” provision for installations and a provision for installations to pool their allowances. For a complete description 
of the Directive see European Commission (2003a). 
3 An installation is defined as “a stationary technical unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I (industry 
sectors covered by the trading program) are carried out and any other directly associated activities which have a 
technical connection with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and 
pollution” (EC 2003a). Member States are responsible for compiling a list of applicable installations in their 
National Allocation Plans. 
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specified in the Directive. Current estimates are that more than 12,000 installations will be 
included in the program4, covering 46% of EU CO2 emissions. Table 1 provides a breakdown of 
this number by Member State. The EU may subsequently add additional emissions, sectors, and 
installations in the second phase of the program.  
2.2 Allocation 
Each Member State has an overall target for its national emissions under the European 
Union burden sharing agreement associated with the Kyoto Protocol. A portion of this national 
target must be assigned to the installations participating in the EU ETS, with the remainder of the 
national target available for emissions outside the EU ETS (and presumably addressed by other 
policies). This suggests a three-step process. First, Member States must decide how much of 
their allowable Kyoto emissions will be assigned to the sectors included in the EU ETS (note that 
the choice of installations covered by the EU ETS is not part of this process). Next, Member 
States may devolve this national ETS target into targets for each of the sectors included in the 
program. Finally, national program administrators must develop methodologies to allocate these 
sectoral targets to individual installations.  
Member States must submit National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for review and approval 
by the European Commission by the end of March 2004. Although Member States have some 
flexibility in determining their allocations, they must comply with common criteria contained in 
the Directive. The criteria are intended to prevent unfair competitive advantage and to encourage 
progress towards meeting the Kyoto targets. In addition, the Directive requires that the allocation 
of emission allowances will be largely free, though up to 5% of allowances may be auctioned  
in the first period and up to 10% may be auctioned in the second period. The Commission  
will review the National Allocation Plans and has three months to decide whether it will reject 
those plans. Member States must finalize their allocations for the first compliance period by 
October 1, 2004. 
                                                 
4 As will be discussed later, because of incomplete databases, the total number of installations must be estimated. 
More definitive numbers of installations will be available when all National Allocation Plans are final. 
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2.3 Monitoring and Registries 
The Commission has released proposed monitoring and reporting guidelines for 
installations in the EU ETS (EC 2004a). Continuous emissions monitors are optional; most 
installations are expected to use emission factors coupled with fuel use or production data to 
calculate their emissions. To track emissions allowances, each Member State must have its own 
national allowance registry, although it may join with other Member States to combine registries. 
The Commission will operate a computerized independent transaction log that will serve as a 
centralized clearinghouse to verify allowance transfers between national registries (EC 2003a). 
Thus, a bilateral trade between two different Member States involves communication between 
three different electronic data systems. 
2.4 Offsets 
 The Commission has proposed that Kyoto offsets (CDM and JI) would be allowed to 
meet Member State caps in the second phase of the EU ETS (EC, 2003b). According to the 
proposal, there is an initial limit on the use of offsets at 6% of the total EU ETS cap. However, if 
offsets reach the 6% limit, there will be an automatic review of the role of offsets to determine 
whether the limit on the use of offsets should be raised to 8%. Clean development mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) credits would be converted into EU allowances, and they 
will be completely fungible with other allowances in the program. The exact rules for the 
integration of CDM and JI credits into the EU ETS are still under negotiation. 
2.5 Banking and Borrowing 
Banking and some degree of borrowing are possible within any compliance period. 
Banking between the first two compliance periods is allowed in principle. However, each 
Member State can decide whether and how this will occur, including any restrictions on the 
number of allowances that may be banked. Member States must allow banking from the second 
period (2008–2012) and thereafter to any subsequent period. 
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2.6 Enforcement and Compliance 
The EU Directive provides penalties for emissions in excess of surrendered allowances of 
€40/ton CO2 in the first period, and €100/ton CO2 in the second period.5 Excess emissions must 
also be offset in the following compliance period. Additional administrative and criminal 
penalties (for example, for fraudulent reporting) are left to the Member States, with only general 
guidance from the Directive. The Directive also requires the publication of the names of 
operators who are not in compliance.  
2.7 Linkages to Non-Kyoto Regimes 
The EU directive raises explicitly the possibility that it can be linked to other national 
domestic GHG trading schemes. The directive makes it clear, however, that the EU ETS will 
only link with parties that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Countries that link with the EU ETS 
will have their allowances recognized in the EU system on the basis of a bilateral agreement 
between the European Union and that country.6  
3. The EU ETS versus Benchmarks and U.S. Cap-and-Trade Programs 
The design of the EU ETS builds upon the experience of earlier emissions trading 
programs, but the scope and complexity of the program is far greater than past efforts. The EU 
Trading Program will require Member States to develop the administrative infrastructure to 
implement a complex trading program in a relatively short period. By any measure, EU member 
countries have an enormous job ahead of them to pull together all of the pieces necessary to run a 
cap-and-trade program. In this section, we will first briefly review some of the literature on cap-
                                                 
5 Currently $50 and $123/ton CO2, $180 and $450/ ton carbon, respectively. 
6 Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland have been mentioned as possible candidates for linkage. Non-European 
countries such as Japan or Canada could also link to the EU ETS. However, numerous issues would have to be 
resolved, such as whether there could be linkage where emissions targets take a different form than the absolute 
targets used within the EU ETS. For example, it is uncertain whether the EU would link to a scheme like Canada’s, 
which has relative targets and a price cap. (For a discussion of issues associated with linking domestic schemes, see 
Baron and Bygrave, 2003.)  
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and-trade implementation and summarize the U.S. SO2 and NOx trading programs. We will begin 
our comparison with a look at the size and scope of EU ETS versus these U.S. programs. Next, 
we will provide a more in-depth analysis of the target setting, allocation, and compliance features 
of the EU ETS and compare them to similar features in past cap-and-trade programs. In 
particular, we will focus on the multijurisdictional nature of the EU ETS and explore the 
differences between the federal U.S. multi-state programs and the less centralized EU structure. 
3.1  Benchmarks in the Literature 
The economics literature is rife with discussions of emissions trading and how market-
based policies offer environmental protection at a lower cost to various regulatory alternatives 
(see Tietenberg, 1985). The literature becomes a bit thinner when one considers more practical 
concerns about how such policies ought to be implemented. Project 88 was an effort more than a 
decade ago to bring together academic economists, stakeholders, and policymakers to discuss 
and address such concerns (Stavins, 1989). Out of that effort came a list of criteria against which 
proposals could be measured, including: will the approach achieve the environmental goals at the 
lowest cost; how easily or costly will monitoring and enforcement be; will the policy be flexible 
in the face of change; will the policy give dynamic incentives to innovate; will the purpose and 
nature of the policy be broadly understandable to the general public; will the economic effects be 
equitably distributed; and will the policy be politically feasible? 
A more recent discussion of practical concerns was discussed in CEA (2002). Chapter six 
of this book deals with institution building related to environmental issues. Through a series of 
case studies of successes and failures, they emphasize the need for a large market, the absence of 
restrictions on trade, flexibility in the face of unexpected shocks, and low monitoring costs. They 
also draw attention not just to the formal rules, regulations, markets, monitoring, and 
administrative features associated with a policy, but also the informal knowledge, experience, 
and norms that are necessary for a successful outcome. That is, they emphasize the need for 
market participants to be prepared for the market-based policy. 
The question of flexibility in the face of unexpected shocks was first addressed by 
Weitzman (1974). Weitzman pointed out that when marginal benefits are relatively flat—which 
tends to be the case for a long-lived stock pollutant like CO2—and marginal costs are relatively 
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steep, price-based mechanisms are preferred. This point has been made more specifically for 
stock pollutants by Newell and Pizer (2003) and more specifically for climate change by Pizer 
(2002). Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) argue that banking can play a similar role in the face of 
unexpected shocks, but do not dispute the importance of such mechanisms. 
Stavins (2003) provides a recent summary of experience with and lessons from market-
based policies from around the world. He focuses on several lessons relevant for emissions 
trading that concern flexibility, simplicity, monitoring and enforcement, and the capacity of the 
private sector. On flexibility, he argues that flexibility over time (banking) and flexibility in 
technology choice has been particularly important in the past. He suggests that simple rules 
regarding allocation and trades are important to avoiding contest and manipulation, and to 
encourage market participation, respectively. Based on his survey of programs, Stavins 
concludes that without effective monitoring and/or enforcement most programs are ineffective. 
Finally, he observes that many firms are poorly equipped to take full advantage of market-based 
policies. Perhaps because they are unsure about the future of such programs, many firms have 
yet to reorganize from an approach designed to minimize the cost of compliance with command-
and-control regulation to an approach designed to make strategic decisions in the marketplace. 
One way to summarize these discussions is to group various concerns along the lines of 
enforcement, equity, and efficiency (which includes issues related to education, flexibility, and 
liquidity). A successful emissions trading program needs to monitor emissions and enforce the 
requirement to surrender allowances equal to those emissions; if not, cheating is rewarded and 
the environmental goals are compromised. A successful program also needs to allocate emissions 
allowances (more broadly, address the distribution of program costs) in a way that is simple, 
transparent, and equitable in order to avoid contest and manipulation, as well as to remain 
politically viable. Finally, in order to reach the goal of lowering compliance costs and achieving 
efficiency, participants in an emissions trading program need to be educated in its operation and 
to make strategic decisions to take advantage of flexible program features. These flexibility 
features, in turn, need to ensure a liquid market both within and across time periods, to moderate 
volatility, and to promote innovative behavior. 
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3.2 Summary of U.S. Multistate Emission Trading Programs 
The U.S. is currently implementing two major multistate emissions cap-and-trade 
programs: (1) the SO2 Trading Program, which began in the early 1990s and (2) a regional NOx 
Trading Program, which began in the late 1990s. These programs are described briefly below.7 
SO2: The U.S. SO2 Program caps SO2 emissions from large electric power units (over 25 
megawatt generating capacity) in the continental 48 states in two phases. The first phase, from 
1995 to 2000, encompassed about 374 of the largest emitting units (over 100 MW of capacity) at 
more than 100 power plants. During the second phase, which began in 2000, all covered units 
over 25 MW capacity are included (involving about 3,000 generating units, of which about 1,800 
are responsible for about 99 percent of emissions) at more than 700 power plants. The initial 
allocation of allowances under the SO2 cap was based on historic fuel input in the mid-1980s 
multiplied by an emissions performance standard.8 All allowances are bankable. The SO2 
program is implemented largely at the federal level by EPA and is national in geographic scope. 
The U.S. EPA runs electronic allowance and emissions registries and is responsible for 
verification of emissions data.  
NOx: In many ways, the U.S. NOx trading program is more analogous to the EU ETS 
than is the SO2 program. The NOx cap-and-trade program is a multi-jurisdictional partnership 
between federal and state governments. It has evolved in geographic scope over time, first 
encompassing nine northeastern states in the late 1990s. In 2004, it was expanded to include 19 
states and the District of Columbia with two additional states to be added in 2005.9 Unlike the 
SO2 program, the NOx program includes certain large industrial boilers with over 250 million 
Btus heat input/hour (such as at petroleum refineries, pulp and paper plants, and steel plants) as 
                                                 
7 Descriptions of the SO2 and NOx programs are available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets. Burtraw and Palmer 
(2003) and Ellerman (2003) provide recent assessments of the SO2 program. Farrell (2001) and Burtraw and Evans 
(2003) provide an assessment of the 9 State NOx OTC program. 
8 In addition to the basic allocation formula, there were also a variety of special formulas that addressed early 
reductions, high growth States, and other issues (Kete, 1993, Joskow and Schmalensee, 2001). 
9 The initial program is referred to as the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) program and the expanded NOx cap-
and-trade program is the sometimes referred to as the NOx SIP Call Program 
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well as electric generating units. Under the NOx Trading Program, states have fixed NOx budgets 
and may use varying means of specifying how allowances will be distributed within each state. 
For the NOx Trading Program, EPA issued a “model rule” that specified areas for consistency 
among states (for example, in enforcement) as well as areas of flexibility (for example, allocation 
of allowances to firms). U.S. EPA runs the allowance and emissions registries, verifies emissions 
data, and reconciles emissions and allowances at the end of each year. 
3.3 Comparison of Size and Scope 
Table 2 illustrates several ways in which the scope of the EU program is broader and 
more complex than past U.S. efforts. For example, the EU has more regulated sources and covers 
more industrial sectors. Some of the sectors covered, such as cement or iron and steel, have more 
varied sources of emissions, for which emissions measurement is not as straight forward as the 
utility and industrial boilers that make up the bulk of the U.S. programs. The EU ETS could also 
include multiple greenhouse gases in the second phase of the program and is likely to include a 
mixture of cap-and-trade and offset provisions. Finally, although the EU program doesn’t 
encompass significantly more political jurisdictions than the multijurisdictional U.S. NOx 
program, the EU ETS structure is considerably more decentralized than that of U.S. trading 
programs. This will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
3.4 Comparison of Allowance Allocation Process in the EU and U.S.  
3.4.1 EU National Allocation Plans  
Probably the most difficult step in the development of the EU ETS is the preparation and 
review of National Allocation Plans. By March 31, 2004, Member States were to have submitted 
a plan to the Commission that contained a list of installations with their proposed allocations and 
an extensive justification of the decisions and methodologies used to make the allocation. The 
EU Directive provided Member States with general criteria for allocation, including ensuring 
that the allocation is “consistent with achieving the overall Kyoto target.” In addition, the 
allocation was to take into account: 
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•  the proportion of emissions in the capped sector compared to total emissions  
•  actual and projected emissions 
•  the impact of other policies on emissions 
•  the technical potential of activities to reduce emissions within the sector 
Member States were also to describe an approach in their plans for providing access to 
allowances for new entrants into the system. For example, Member States may simply require 
new entrants to purchase allowances on the market, or they may create “set-aside” pools of 
allowances that will be allocated free of charge to new installations. Member States also have the 
option to adjust allocations to take into account early actions to reduce emissions and to address 
potential competition from non-EU countries. 
Finally, Member States must include an opportunity for public participation in the review 
of the National Allocation Plan. According to the Directive, there should be two rounds of public 
comment. First, the public should have an opportunity to provide input into the proposed NAP 
before it has been submitted to the Commission. Second, there should be an opportunity for 
public comment after the proposed NAP is submitted to the Commission, but before the plan is 
final on October 1, 2004, for the first compliance period (EC, 2004b). 
After the Commission receives the plans at the end of March, it has three months to 
review whether the plans meet the allocation criteria. Of particular concern to the Commission is 
the evaluation of “State Aid” considerations related to allowance allocation. “State Aid” is a term 
of art within the EU that refers to public subsidies that give industry within one Member State an 
unfair competitive advantage over industry within another country. The evaluation of this 
criterion will be conducted by the Competition Directorate—the department within the 
Commission that makes determinations on all State Aid issues (Carbon, 2004).  
For those who are primarily familiar with U.S. cap-and-trade programs, the term 
“National Allocation Plan” understates the scope of decisions that must be made. In the U.S., the 
term “allocation process” usually refers to decisions about allocating to firms after a cap has 
already been decided. However, in the National Allocation Plan process, there are three decisions 
that must be made by each Member State, more or less simultaneously.  
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The first decision that must be made by Member States is how much of their Kyoto target 
will be given to the sectors participating in the emissions trading program—that is, the level of 
the cap for ETS sources within their borders. Each of the 15 original Member States has national 
targets for Kyoto compliance that have been negotiated under the EU’s burden sharing 
agreement. The EU ETS is essentially a “cap within a cap.” Therefore, as they decide how much 
of this burden the ETS sectors will meet, Member States are deciding (either implicitly or 
explicitly) how much the non-capped sectors will contribute to meeting the national target 
(Harrison and Radov, 2002). Note that the Directive already establishes which categories of 
activities Member States must cover under the program.  
Once it is decided how much of a country’s overall Kyoto target should be assigned to 
the trading program, the National Allocation Plan may set targets for each of the sectors 
involved. This is a particularly difficult decision because a sector’s target will determine its net 
costs (mitigation expense plus net cost of allowance purchases) and may have implications for 
competitiveness within the EU. In other words, industrial sectors in two different Member States 
with different allocations would have differing profitability, which could affect their liquidity 
and ability to raise capital, if not directly affect relative prices.10  
Put another way, to the extent that sectors included in the ETS must deliver emissions 
reductions beyond expected levels that encompass existing emissions reduction policies or 
programs, Member States must decide upon which sectors to impose the economic burden via 
reduced allowance allocations. To make this decision, Member States must balance a complex 
array of factors, including relative cost effectiveness, competitiveness issues, and equity. The 
United Kingdom’s Draft National Allocation Plan illustrates this point. During the first 
compliance period, the draft NAP proposes to allocate to sources at levels that reflect their 
projected emissions based on existing sectoral climate change agreements negotiated with 
                                                 
10 Because there is one market and one price associated with all emission allowances, marginal production costs are 
unaffected by allocation unless allocations are updated based on production. In that case, the updating allocation 
serves to subsidize production costs. See Burtraw (2001) and Fischer (2001). The EU ETS Directive does not allow 
for updating of allocation decisions within a trading phase, but updating could occur across phases. 
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industry. However, the U.K. may decide to reduce allocations by an additional amount in the 
power sector. In justifying this additional reduction, the U.K. government notes: 
This reflects the fact that power generation faces limited international competition—
electricity imports amounted to only 2% of total electricity supplied in 2002; exports 
were considerably lower than that; and all trade is concentrated in the EU market, all of 
which is affected by the EU ETS—and has relatively good, low-cost abatement 
opportunities. (DEFRA, 2004a)11 
In contrast, in the U.S. SO2 and NOx programs, target setting was done before the 
allocation to firms was begun. For the SO2 Trading Program, the U.S. Congress decided the 
sector cap first and then later determined allocation formulas for splitting the cap between firms 
(Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998), although clearly the cost imposed on the electricity sector was 
a key factor in setting the cap (Kete, 1993). In the U.S. NOx trading program, caps for 
participating states were based on common metrics. In the case of the 9 State OTC program, caps 
were based on the less stringent of a percent reduction of historic emissions or a performance 
standard. The cap in the expanded 22 jurisdiction NOx SIP Call Program was also based on a 
performance standard. In both cases, once the cap was determined, states then had the flexibility 
to allocate their allowance budgets to sources according to various formulas. 12  
Although a complete discussion of the options available to Member States for allocation 
to firms is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting the complexity of the issues 
involved. Harrison and Radov (2002) outline some of the design variables for allocation, 
including whether allocations should fixed based on historic measures or updated over time; 
whether they should be based on emissions, production, or fuel use; and whether they should 
take into account special issues such as early reductions and other policies. A growing literature 
is exploring the efficiency and equity implications of these different approaches (Burtraw, 2001, 
Fisher 2001). However, the point here is that allocation decisions typically affect different firms 
                                                 
11 The United Kingdom is reportedly revisiting some of the decisions in its draft NAP. Thus, this statement should 
be viewed as an illustration of the factors that influence allocation decisions, rather than as indictative of the final 
allocation decision. 
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and sectors in very different ways. Because different approaches create winners and losers, 
allocation is primarily a political, as well as a technical decision. Allocation decisions are certain 
to be controversial and may be difficult for some Member States to resolve quickly.  
3.4.2 Allocation Implementation Challenges 
In addition to the political and policy challenges raised by the National Allocation Plans, 
there are significant practical implementation challenges for the Member States. Depending on 
the allocation formula, there may be a need to have accurate data for a given base year on 
emissions, fuel use, and output. In some cases, the necessary data to make the allocation may be 
unavailable or incomplete (Harrison and Radov, 2002; Mullins, 2003). Incomplete information 
on sources has led to changing estimates of the number of installations covered by the EU ETS, 
varying from 10,000 to 17,000.  
Though not required, at least some Member States may use third party verification of 
their baseline data. The U.K. and Germany have stated that they will require third party 
verification, and it is possible that other Member States may follow their leads (Phillips, 2004). 
We examine some of the challenges associated with third party verification below in our 
discussion of compliance. 
The U.S. SO2 program illustrates the time-consuming nature of the allocation process. 
EPA began to compile the data for its allocation database in 1989 and conducted two separate 
formal public comment processes on the data. EPA found that allocation methodologies 
sometimes require steps beyond just quality assurance of emissions and activity data. For 
example, because SO2 allocations were based on average heat input during the period from 1985 
to 1987, units with significant outages would have received fewer allocations than similar units 
that were in continuous service. Therefore, EPA collected data on the number of continuous 
hours a unit was out of service due to a planned or forced outage. Using this data, EPA adjusted 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 For example, in the NOx OTC program, some states used a benchmark based on heat input and others used a 
benchmark based on electricity generation output. States also have used a variety of different provisions to address 
new entrants, early reductions, and incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy (Harrison and Radov, 
2002). 
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the data for units as if they were operating during extended outages. If there were individual 
outages each totaling less than four months during the period 1985–1987, no adjustment was 
made to the calculations. Ultimately, the national allocation database was finalized in March 
1993 when EPA published its final allowance allocations and implementing regulations. Thus, 
the entire process took almost four years (Harvey et al., 2003). A key challenge facing the EU 
ETS will be to determine installation-level allowance allocations over a period of nine months 
(assuming the initial plan is accepted) or less. 
3.4.3 Comparison to Literature  
Much of the literature on the distribution of tradable allowances describes the benefits of 
auctioning allowances rather than distributing them at no cost. These benefits include providing a 
source of revenue that could potentially address inequities brought about by a carbon policy, 
creation of an equal opportunity for new entrants in the allowance market, avoiding the potential 
for “windfall profits” that might accrue to emissions sources if allowances are allocated at no 
charge, and avoiding the politically contentious process of allowance allocation13 (Crampton and 
Kerr, 1998). Moreover, the revenues from auctioning allowances may have economy-wide 
efficiency benefits if they are used for certain purposes such as reducing taxes (Crampton and 
Kerr, 1998, Goulder et al., 1998, Dinan and Rogers, 2002).  
Despite these apparent benefits, there has been little experience with the use of auctions 
in the distribution of tradable emissions allowances in the United States.14 This is largely because 
of the political difficulty in convincing industry groups to support auctions. The EU Directive 
provides at least the possibility of a modest experiment with auctions by allowing Member States 
to auction up to 5 percent of their allocation in the first phase and 10 percent in the second phase. 
                                                 
13 On the other hand, the subsequent process by legislatures to distribute these revenues could be equally 
contentious. 
14 The SO2 trading program contains a small reserve auction and there have been recent reports that the states of 
Kentucky and Virginia are considering auctioning a portion of their NOx allowances under the NOx SIP Call 
Program. 
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It remains to be seen, however, how many Member States will take advantage of this provision.15 
The use of this provision by even a few Member States would be a significant innovation and 
would provide valuable lessons for future trading programs.  
Ultimately, however, the vast majority of allowances in the EU ETS will be allocated at 
no cost as they were in U.S. programs. The literature on the U.S. experience with the free 
allocation of emission allowances to firms describes the deeply political nature of these 
processes (Kete, 1993, Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998; Raymond, 2003). For example, the 
simple initial allocation methodology in the original Acid Rain Program legislative proposal 
program ultimately became a complicated amalgam of more than 29 formulas by the time it had 
passed through the entire U.S. legislative process (McLean, 1996). The Regional Clear Air 
Incentives Market, or RECLAIM, program in Southern California similarly went from a 
relatively simple formula proposed by the local regulatory agency to a much more complex set 
of allocation formulas after a lengthy stakeholder process (Ellerman et al. 2003).  
What are the implications of this past experience for the EU ETS allocation process? On 
one hand, there are several unique aspects of the EU ETS that could make allocation more 
difficult than in past programs. First, the scope of the economic rents at stake are much higher in 
the EU ETS than in past emissions trading programs. The wealth transfers inherent in the EU 
system could be 20 times greater (or more) than those of past trading programs (see Table 2). 
Thus, the distributional consequences are greater and are more likely to make the process even 
more politically difficult. Second, the three-stage decisionmaking on allocation described above 
is also complex and difficult to do quickly. This is particularly worrisome because of the tight 
timeframe for submitting National Allocation Plans. This tight timeframe may also prevent 
Member States from doing necessary quality assurance on the emissions and other data that are 
necessary for determining allocations. 
                                                 
15 Thus far, two Member States have announced that they will auction portions of their allocations. Denmark will 
auction 5% of its allocation and use the proceeds for purchase of CDM and JI credits. Ireland will auction .75 % of 
its allocation and use the proceeds to cover the costs of administering its emissions trading program. 
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On the other hand, the lesson of the U.S. experience may be that once the allocations are 
final, it may not matter whether the allocation process or methodologies were messy. To varying 
degrees, U.S. trading programs have been successful despite complex allocation processes and 
formulas. In each case there was a political allocation process that finally came to a resolution 
and allowed the programs to progress. Similarly, by providing multiple opportunities for public 
comment and by subjecting the National Allocation Plans to a Commission review, including 
review by the Competition Directorate, the EU ETS appears to place a high value on 
transparency and equity in its allocation process. Inevitably, not everyone will be happy with the 
outcome. However, as long as there is not “political gridlock” that prevents the program from 
going forward or undermines the future use of the cap-and-trade mechanism, it will be difficult 
to say that the allocation process was unsuccessful.  
3.5 Comparison of Enforcement and Compliance Features 
Compliance and enforcement provisions give emissions trading programs environmental 
integrity and provide the incentive for an efficient outcome. These provisions include (1) 
accurate and complete emissions monitoring and reporting; (2) tracking of tradable permits with 
an electronic registry; (3) automatic financial penalties for excess emissions; (4) a credible threat 
of enforcement action if provisions of the compliance regime are violated; and (5) public access 
to emissions and trading data (U.S. EPA, 2003a). Following is a discussion of these provisions 
within the EU ETS, and a comparison to provisions within U.S. programs. 
3.5.1 Emissions Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
In the U.S., there are detailed and prescriptive requirements for continuous emissions 
monitors (CEMs) for both SO2 and NOx, programs. (U.S. EPA 2003c). Emissions are reported 
electronically to the EPA, there are extensive electronic auditing procedures, and there are 
occasional on-site audits of facilities. Monitoring regulations emphasize complete accounting 
and consistency among sources.  
The EU’s emissions monitoring, reporting, and verification system procedures vary from 
the U.S. example in several ways. First, the proposed guidelines are less prescriptive and give 
considerably more flexibility to installations and to the Member States to develop specific 
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monitoring procedures. The guidance spells out different “tiers” of methodologies with different 
degrees of assumed accuracy. For example, for general combustion activities (for example, 
burning fuel in an industrial boiler), the highest tier method would require measurement of fuel 
with methods resulting in a maximum permissible uncertainty of + or – 1% and would require an 
installation specific emissions factor for the batch of fuel used. The lowest tier method would 
require measurement of fuel with methods resulting in a maximum permissible uncertainty of  
+ or – 7.5% and would allow the use of standardized, general emissions factors listed in the 
Appendix of the EU guidance (EC, 2004a).  
Under the proposed guidance, firms would propose installation-specific methodologies to 
the relevant authority in each Member State. Installations are assumed to use the top tiers, but 
they may petition to use lower tiered methods that is, with lower assumed accuracy if they show 
that a methodology is impractical or cannot be achieved at reasonable cost. Each Member State 
has the autonomy to grant waivers from use of the top tier methods. No adjustments of emissions 
measurements or calculations are required to compensate for the greater uncertainty of lower tier 
methods (EC, 2004a). 
One reason for the less prescriptive approach is that there is more variety in the types of 
sources that must be monitored than in U.S. programs. The SO2 program in the United States 
consists entirely of electric power plants. Although the U.S. NOx program has some industrial 
sources as well as electric power sources, most of these sources are combustion boilers that are 
monitored similarly to power plants. In contrast, the EU program also includes process sources, 
such as cement and iron and steel installations, which may have unique monitoring requirements. 
The EU’s monitoring, reporting, and verification system is also more decentralized than 
systems used in past cap-and-trade programs. For example, in addition to the flexibility of 
choosing monitoring methodologies discussed above, the EU ETS delegates emissions 
verification to the Member States, who may use either a government authority or a third party. If 
they elect to use third party verification, a Member State is required to set up a process to certify 
that third-party verifiers are qualified to verify emission reports. The Directive does not impose 
uniform, mandatory standards for this certification. 
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The use of third party verification for a cap-and-trade program raises several questions. 
First, is this approach more cost-effective and efficient than having a more centralized 
verification of the data by Member State authorities? Third party verification may reduce 
government costs while providing valuable technical expertise to some Member State authorities 
who may not have adequate internal staff resources. However, it will likely increase costs  
to industry. In the UK Emissions Trading System, verification costs ranged from €5,000– 
€7,500 ($6,250–$9,375) for a simple site to €10,000–€20,000 ($12,500–$25,000) or more  
for a more complex site (Phillips, 2003b). Thus, assuming an average cost of €10,000 per 
installation, annual costs for verification of 12,000 installations could be €120 million ($150 
million) or more.16  
Second, will there be inconsistencies in interpretation of guidelines among different 
verifiers? Inevitably there are numerous technical issues that come up in the course of emissions 
measurement. Will all verifiers make the same interpretations? Who will resolve inconsistencies, 
and will there be a “case law” of decisions shared among verifiers?  
Perhaps equally important is ensuring that all verifiers are credible and independent of 
the firms they are verifying. Phillips (2003) argues that the there is a danger that “different 
national jurisdictions in the EU will adopt different ‘standards’ of verification with different 
guidance resulting in different ‘levels of assurance’ given in the verification opinions .” There 
may also be perverse incentives caused by the use of third party verifiers hired by the firms 
themselves. In theory, firms could shop for verifiers who provide the most lenient treatment of 
emission accounting. Some have argued that it is important to avoid a “race to the bottom” by 
verifiers, who may have an incentive to provide lower cost, less stringent verification to 
compete. (Phillips, 2003). 
                                                 
16 Roughly 5% of total estimated costs (see economic analysis below). A number of variables could affect costs per 
installation, including whether management of the installation has prepared adequate monitoring plans and 
documentation of its annual emissions and whether more than one installation can be grouped together for 
verification (Phillips, 2003b). 
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Decentralized verification is a dramatic departure from the U.S. experience in which 
there is centralized verification of emissions data by the EPA. The U.S. system relies heavily 
upon electronic reporting and electronic auditing of data.17 Electronic reporting has both made it 
possible to process and analyze emissions data and to make this data available to the public in an 
accessible form on the Internet (Kruger et al. 2000). EPA also makes monitoring policy decisions 
that apply to sources across all states in the SO2 and NOx programs. 
3.5.2 Registries  
Although the term “registry” is used in several different ways, it generally refers to an 
allowance tracking system in the EU context. Allowance tracking registries track account 
information, account holdings, and transfers of allowances among private parties. In many cases, 
these systems assign serial numbers to allowances that contain identifying information such as 
information on the facility where the allowance originated and the year (“vintage”) in which the 
allowance was issued. Registries allow program administrators to perform various functions, 
such as setting up allowance accounts, issuing allowances, and retiring allowances (Schreifels, 
2001). Although some registries allow allowance holders to transfer their allowances to others 
online, registries are not trading platforms. Rather, they are data systems that protect the integrity 
of trading programs by ensuring that only the fixed number of allowances embodied in an 
emissions cap are transferred and used for compliance.  
The state of the art for registries has advanced considerably since the EPA developed the 
first allowance and emissions registries for the SO2 program in the early 1990s. Costs have come 
down, and functionality has increased significantly. For example, EPA’s recently developed 
Emissions and Allowance Tracking System software (EATS) is an integrated data system (that is 
it tracks both allowances and emissions) with a variety of features including the ability to be used 
for multiple pollutants, to communicate with other registry systems, and to provide electronic 
reports on data to the government or the public (Schreifels, 2003). The United Kingdom and 
                                                 
17 Although the EU program requires an electronic registry to track allowance data, there is no similar requirement 
for electronic emissions tracking systems.  
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France are also building registry systems, which will be used for the EU ETS and for Kyoto 
compliance (Fremont, 2003).  
The EU program will add a layer of complexity to the use of allowance registries because 
each Member State may have its own registry. Member States may also join together to share 
common registries, but for a variety of sovereignty and political reasons, they may not choose to 
do so (Fremont, 2003). Separate Member State registries will communicate through standardized 
protocols, and the European Commission will run an independent transaction log, which will 
serve as a communications hub between national registries and conduct various automated 
checks (EC, 2004c). Although this is technically feasible (and is the same registry approach used 
in the Kyoto Protocol), it is considerably more complicated than running one, centralized 
registry. In contrast, multijurisdictional programs in the United States., such as the NOx OTC and 
SIP Call, had a centralized registry run by EPA to track allowances in the program.  
3.5.3 Public Access to Emissions and Trading Data 
In the United States, emissions data from the SO2 and NOx trading programs are available 
to the public and may be accessed through the Internet. There are no confidentiality requirements 
for this data. The public can also access data on allowance transfers among different accounts in 
EPA’s registry. It is important to note that these transfers represent only a portion of all 
allowance trades. Trades may be conducted contractually between private parties, and there is no 
obligation to notify the EPA or transfer allowances in the registry unless these allowances are to 
be used to meet a compliance obligation.  
Similarly, the EU directive requires Member States to makes emissions and allowance 
data available to the public. The forthcoming registries regulation will include common 
emissions and allowance data elements that must be reported and made available to the public 
(Lefevere, 2004). However, the availability of emissions data may still be subject to certain 
limitations, which include cases in which data is judged to violate national laws designed to 
ensure business confidentiality (EC, 2003). It is unclear whether Member States will handle 
these determinations of data confidentiality in a consistent manner.  
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 3.5.4 Penalties and Enforcement  
As mentioned above, the EU Directive provides for excess emissions penalties of €40/ton 
CO2 in the first period, and €100/ton CO2 in the second period. There is also a requirement to 
offset excess emissions in the following year (that is, firms who pay the penalty must still obtain 
the required allowances in the following year). Although excess emissions penalties are set 
uniformly for all Member States in the EU, additional civil and criminal penalties (such as, for 
fraudulent reporting) are left to the Member States, with a requirement that the Commission be 
notified about the relevant legal provisions (EC, 2003a). The Directive also requires the 
publication of the names of operators who are not in compliance (the so-called “naming and 
shaming” provision). Among the 25 different EU Member States, there are significantly different 
legal systems, enforcement cultures, and administrative capabilities. An uneven approach to 
enforcement among Member States could create unfair competitive advantages for firms in 
Member States with weaker enforcement regimes. In a Partial Regulatory Impact Statement in 
support of the United Kingdom ’s draft National Allocation Plan, the authors note: “If 
monitoring and enforcement is not pursued with equal skill and rigour within and across Member 
States this could lead to distributive and competitive effects at the installation, sector and country 
level” (DEFRA, 2004b). 
Special concerns have been expressed about the Accession Countries where there 
historically there have been weak environmental institutions.18 Of the Accession Countries, 
Poland has the largest number of installations (approximately 1200) followed by the Czech 
Republic (500), Slovakia (200), and Hungary (300). Concerns about weak institutions are not 
limited to Accession Countries, however. For example, Tabara (2003) argues that Spain’s 
environmental administrative capacity has not always been adequate to face complex problems 
such as climate change. 
                                                 
18 For example, Blackman and Harrington (2000) have described some of the difficulties Poland has had with 
enforcing its emissions fee system. Also, see Bell and Russell (2002) and Kruger et al. (2003) for different views of 
whether emissions trading is appropriate for economies in transition and developing countries.  
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3.5.5 Enforcement at the EU Level of Member State Requirements 
Thus far, we have discussed features of the EU ETS associated with enforcement and 
compliance at the firm level. There are parallel issues associated with the enforcement of the 
responsibilities of Member States. The EU ETS is now binding law, and Member States are 
required to transpose it into national law and to abide by its mandatory provisions. Failure to 
implement provisions of the EU ETS can result in enforcement proceedings—initiated by the 
Commission and followed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) if necessary. Ultimately, the 
ECJ has the authority to impose fines on Member States if its rulings are not followed. However, 
this is considered a last resort that is only taken if a number of other legal steps fail to induce 
compliance (Borchardt, 1999).19 In the past, this has proven to be an important incentive for 
Member States to comply before the actual imposition of a fine (Lefevere, 2004). 
Commentators have written of the “implementation gap” in European environmental 
regulations (Jordan and Jeppesen, 2000). A recent EU survey found that “there is difficulty in the 
timely and correct implementation as well as proper application of community environmental 
law by Member States” (EC, 2003d). In some cases, this failure to implement comes from  
delays in transposing EU laws into national laws. In other cases, laws are not interpreted or 
applied correctly.  
It is too early to tell if there will be significant delays in the implementation of the  
EU ETS or if there will be misapplication of the EU rules. However, it is worth noting that the 
first significant deadline of the process, the requirement to incorporate provisions of the EU 
directive into national law by December 31, 2003, was only met by one of the 15 EU Member 
States ( the United Kingdom; Bloomberg News Service, February 6, 2004). The European 
Commission has subsequently begun preliminary enforcement actions against Member States 
who missed the deadline (Hobley, 2004). More recently, additional governments have adopted 
national laws incorporating the Directive, and additional laws are pending with national 
parliaments (Zapfel, 2004). 
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3.5.6 Comparison to Literature 
Several critical elements of an effective enforcement regime for emissions trading are 
described in the literature. First, excess emissions penalties create a necessary incentive to meet 
the cap. These penalties should be set at levels substantially higher than the prevailing permit 
price to create the appropriate incentives for compliance (Stranland et al., 2002; Swift, 2001). On 
the other hand, penalties can be viewed as a “safety” valve on the market, limiting how high 
prices can go in the face of unexpected events (see more below). In any case, if excess emissions 
penalties for tradable permit programs are too high, regulatory authorities may be reluctant to 
impose them (Tietenberg, 2003).  
In addition to the level of the penalties, the certainty that a penalty will be imposed is a 
critical element in providing the correct incentives in an emissions trading program. The 
automatic nature of excess emissions penalties in U.S. trading programs is in contrast with the 
traditional regulatory approach where sources in violation may negotiate for a regulatory 
exemption (Ellerman, 2003a). If these negotiation costs are less than the cost of compliance, then 
participants in a trading program have little incentive to comply. Conversely, if participants in a 
trading program know that the costs of a ton of excess emissions will exceed the cost of buying 
an allowance on the market, they have every financial incentive to comply.  
A second necessary component of an enforcement regime is reasonably accurate 
emissions monitoring (Stranland et al., 2002; Peterson, 2002). San Martin (2003) has 
demonstrated that incomplete monitoring can undermine the efficiency of trading programs. 
Moreover, although Ellerman et al. (2000) note that the costs of the monitoring regime in the 
U.S. SO2 program are not insignificant, they maintain that rigorous monitoring gives 
environmental regulators the confidence to dispense with case-by-case reviews of emission 
reductions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Thus far, there are only two instances of fines imposed by the ECJ for Member State noncompliance with EU 
laws (Hobley, 2004). 
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Finally, some commentators note that public access to emissions and trading data builds 
confidence in the environmental results of the program and provides an additional safeguard for 
compliance. (U.S. EPA 2003a). Information technology has been the key to providing this 
transparency in the U.S. emissions trading programs, where all emissions and allowance data are 
available online (Kruger et al., 2000). Tietenberg (2003) argues that public access to this type of 
information may create a greater incentive for firms to comply.  
The EU ETS generally incorporates most of the lessons from the economic literature and 
from past U.S. experience. Most notably, the uniform excess emissions penalties are well above 
the projected marginal costs. On the other hand other penalties, such as those for submitting 
fraudulent data for following monitoring requirements, will be less uniform because they will 
rely on national laws that may vary considerably. The impact of this lack of harmonization 
should be examined in the first years of the EU ETS. In particular, there may be special concerns 
associated with the lack of effective enforcement institutions in the Accession Countries and 
some of the less economically developed southern tier nations of the European Union. 
The EU ETS also emphasizes emissions monitoring through binding guidelines that are 
considerably more detailed than comparable past guidance put forward for EU environmental 
directives. The requirement for independent verification may also provide an important resource 
for Member States with limited internal capability to verify emissions. Similarly, the requirement 
in forthcoming registry regulations to include standardized, installation-level emissions 
information could be a valuable feature of the compliance regime. This will both facilitate 
compliance determinations and public access to emissions data.20 However, as discussed above, 
Member State discretion on the interpretation of monitoring guidelines and the certification of 
third party verifiers may undermine some of the consistency that is necessary for an effective 
monitoring and compliance regime. Moreover, the lack of standardized electronic auditing 
procedures may make it difficult to run an efficient and effective compliance determination 
                                                 
20 The value of this requirement will depend on the type and detail of the data ultimately required by the regulation. 
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process across 25 diverse Member States. These are areas where the European Union may want 
to consider further harmonization as it evaluates the results of its pilot phase. 
3.6 Does the EU System Strike the Right Balance Between Centralization and 
Decentralization? 
As the previous discussion notes, many of the features that have been centrally decided 
within the federal U.S. SO2 trading program and the multijuridictional NOx programs are 
decentralized within the EU system (see Table 3). This is not surprising given that EU Member 
States are sovereign nations while U.S. states are not. Unlike the United .States, the European 
Union is not yet a true federation and the European Commission’s centralized authority is more 
limited.21 Moreover, the approach taken in the Emission Trading Directive is consistent with 
European Community legal tradition, where EC Directives usually set overall standards for 
Member States. Member States are then responsible for implementing the standards and have a 
certain amount of discretion in their interpretation (Hargrave and Lefevere, 1999). Still, it is 
worth noting that with common mandatory excess emissions penalties, mandatory emissions 
monitoring requirements, and veto power over National Allocation Plans, the EU ETS has 
broken new ground in its efforts to harmonize the implementation of an environmental 
requirement across its Member States.  
While absolute standardization is not feasible or necessary, it is an open question whether 
the EU ETS model strikes the right balance between consistency—and simplicity—versus 
national sovereignty. At the outset, it was noted that added complexity can harm the 
effectiveness of a market-based policy. Equity and enforcement are also concerns. For example, 
without the use of common benchmarks, will it be possible to set sectoral targets across Member 
States that are perceived by a critical mass of participants to be equitable? If firms in different 
Member States face significantly different compliance and enforcement regimes, will there be 
                                                 
21 For a discussion of the issues associated with centralized versus decentralized authority in EU environmental 
policy, see Jordan and Jeppesen (2000). 
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different gaming responses that undermine both the environmental credibility and the efficiency 
of the trading system? These questions suggest potential pitfalls to current implementation. 
Aside from variation in design elements, the decentralized nature of the EU ETS also 
raises questions about whether Member States are using comparable data sources and analytical 
tools to develop their National Allocation Plans. For example, emissions projections from 
Member States are done using a variety of techniques and assumptions (EEA, 2003). In contrast, 
for U.S. multijurisdictional programs, analysis of potential targets are done for all states using 
one model and a common set of assumptions (U.S. EPA, 2003).  
Ultimately, questions of standardization in the design and operation of emissions trading 
systems are applicable beyond the EU. To the extent that future climate regimes link different 
domestic trading systems, similar issues are likely to arise. Thus, the balance between centralized 
versus decentralized features in the EU system should be closely evaluated during the pilot phase 
of the program, offering the opportunity to build a foundation as well as experience towards 
future policies. 
4. Uncertainties About Costs and Liquidity 
So far we have discussed some of the implementation questions and challenges faced by 
the European Union in implementing the ETS. From the vantage point of participants this creates 
uncertainty about how the program will operate. This section describes a different concern: 
uncertainty associated with the cost of the program. In some cases, this revolves around 
implementation but in many cases it does not. We will review the most recent economic analysis 
commissioned by the EU for estimating the costs of the ETS and will discuss some of the 
uncertainties associated with this analysis. In particular, we will review assumptions about the 
availability of clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) credits, as 
well as other factors that will affect liquidity in the EU market.  
4.1 Review of EU Economic Analysis 
The European Union’s most recent economic analysis explores the impacts of different 
limits on CDM and JI credits on marginal and total annual costs (Criqui and Kitous, 2003). The 
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analysis uses marginal abatement cost curves from the POLES—Prospective Outlook on  
Long-term Energy Systems—model22 with simulation software to project allowance prices in  
the EU. The model reflects global demand for greenhouse gas offsets and makes the following 
assumptions: 
•  Overall Target. The analysis assumes that the EU’s collective Kyoto target is met. Thus, 
an overall target of 4,664 MtCO2e (million tons of carbon dioxide equivalents)  is 
assumed for the enlarged union—that is, the 15 existing Member States plus the 10 
Accession Countries. 
•  Caps on Trading Sectors. Sectoral caps are set for all scenarios in the analysis by 
assuming that marginal costs are equalized for trading and nontrading sectors within each 
country before trading begins. In other words, the national allocation of allowances to 
ETS sources versus sources outside the ETS is set at efficient levels absent EU trading 
and JI/CDM.23  
•  Offsets. The analysis allows purchase of Kyoto project-level offsets (JI and CDM) from 
outside of the enlarged European Union. Transaction costs are assumed to be 20%. In 
addition, the analysis assumes that there are “accessibility factors” for offsets that vary by 
sector and country. These factors range between 10% and 40%, and they represent the 
need to discount the technical potential for offsets to reflect the indirect incentives to 
bring forth actual reductions. 
•  Government Buyers. The model assumes that there is competing demand for offsets 
from EU governments who must offset emissions in the nontrading sectors to meet  
their Kyoto targets. This is consistent with current activity in the greenhouse gas market. 
For example, the Dutch government has already made significant purchases in the  
                                                 
22 For a detailed description of the POLES model, see Criqui (2001). 
23 Once trading begins, this is no longer efficient because installations outside the trading system cannot respond to 
higher or lower market prices. 
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offset market; several other governments have announced plans to do the same 
(Natsource, 2003). 
•  Russian Tons. Russia is assumed to ratify the Kyoto protocol and make JI credits 
available. However, the analysis assumes that EU Member States will not purchase the 
excess assigned amount units (AAUs) available because of the downturn of the Russian 
economy since the 1990 Kyoto base year. Purchases of these emission reductions, 
sometimes referred to as “hot air,” are controversial in Europe and may not be accepted 
by the EU for Kyoto compliance unless they are “greened” by being tied to specific 
greenhouse gas reduction projects (Henkemans, 2003; Newcomb, 2003). 
Table 4 shows the results of the EU’s analysis for ETS costs in 2010 (note that the full 
cost of Kyoto compliance that include costs in the nontrading sectors are not presented). The 
table presents several scenarios, ranging from no offsets to unlimited offsets. Assuming that the 
6% limit to offsets is reached, the analysis shows estimated allowance prices of €14/ton CO2e 
($64/ton C) and total annual costs of €2.4 billion ($3 billion). This includes the cost of abating 
165 MtCO2e and purchasing of 91 MtCO2e from the world offset market.24 According to the 
analysis, allowing unlimited offsets would drop the price of EU allowances to €12/ton CO2e, 
would only modestly increase the percentage of tons from offsets to 7% and would lower costs 
to €2.2 billion. Meanwhile, the complete absence of credits would double the price to €26/ton 
CO2e and raise costs to €2.9 billion. Note that costs in the 2005 to 2007 period are not estimated 
in the EU’s analysis. However they are expected to be lower and will depend on the targets 
chosen by Member States in their National Allocation Plans (Criqui, 2003). 
4.2 Modeling  Uncertainty 
The aforementioned analysis represents the work of a single modeling team, subject to a 
host of assumptions about how consumers, producers, and the economy as a whole respond to 
                                                 
24 Note that a simple calculation of ½ x €14/tCO2 x 163 mmtCO2 + 91 mmtCO2 x €14/tCO2 equals €2.4B, where 
the first term approximates the average abatement cost times the amount abated and the second term is precisely the 
cost of purchasing offsets abroad.  
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market-based policies. A different modeling team, presented with the same question, could easily 
come up with a different framework, different assumptions, and different results. Such 
differences are distinct from uncertainty about future events, discussed below, and represent 
uncertainty in the modeling exercise itself. This leads us to ask how much impact does model 
choice have on estimates of allowance price and cost. 
A study by the Energy Modeling Forum (Weyant and Hill, 1999) considered the cost of 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol according to a dozen different global energy-economy models. 
A useful element of this exercise is Figure 10 in that article, showing marginal cost schedules for 
various countries and for various fractional emissions reductions based on the different models. 
Because the figure presents results for a range of emission reductions, and because it is scaled to 
fractional reductions, it provides an interesting study of variation in estimated costs based 
primarily on model structure—such as, semi-elasticity’s of abatement supply. For the European 
Union, reductions of 13% (comparable to the no offset case) are in the range of $0 to $400/ton C 
(in $1990). Excluding the extreme cases, the range is about $70-$140/ton C or, converting to 
Euros/ton CO2 and adjusting for inflation, €20–35/tCO2. Compared to Criqui and Kitous (2003), 
the costs are comparable.  
However, the main point is that each Criqui and Kitous estimate should itself be viewed 
as an uncertain guess. Technical modeling assumptions alone appear to introduce an uncertainty 
spread equal to a factor of two. 
4.3 Uncertainties Affecting Liquidity and Prices 
In addition to model structure, there are numerous uncertainties surrounding EU 
implementation and other events beyond EU control that will affect the prices of emission 
allowances and overall costs in the EU ETS. These uncertainties include: 
•  How rapidly will EU emissions grow? 
•  Will the CDM process supply an adequate supply of offsets? 
•  Will all Member States (including the Accession Countries) be ready to participate at the 
start of the program? 
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•  Will Russia ratify Kyoto? 
•  Will the EU systems banking provision work effectively? 
 
Each of these issues is addressed briefly below.  
Emissions Growth. A recent report by the European Environmental Agency showed that 
it will be a challenge for the EU Member States to meet their collective Kyoto target. As Figure 
1 shows, in 2001, greenhouse gas emissions were 2.3% below 1990 levels. This is compared to 
the overall Kyoto burden-sharing target for the EU 15 is 8.0% below 1990 levels. The projection 
for 2010 is even more daunting (Figure 2). It shows that with existing policies and measures, 
emissions will be only 0.5% below 1990 levels. Figure 3 shows that much of the shortfall is 
caused by growth in emissions from the transport sector, which are projected to increase by 34% 
from 1990 levels by 2010.25  
Growth in emissions from the transport sector has important implications for the EU 
trading system. On the one hand, these emissions are not included in the program during the first 
compliance period. However, regardless of whether or not they are included in the second 
period, their growth could have an impact on allowances prices, assuming governments meet the 
Kyoto targets by purchasing offsets to cover growth in the non-trading sector. 
Availability of Offsets. The benchmark economic analysis assumes that in the 6% offset 
scenario, the EU purchases 208 MtCO2 annually (91 in the ETS and 117 by Member States to 
cover sectors outside the ETS). Demand from other Annex B countries (for example, Japan, 
Canada) is an additional 220 tons, for a worldwide total of 428 MtCO2. The analysis projects that 
55% of CDM credits will come from China and 12% will come from India. 
Is it realistic to assume that so many tons will be available? In a study for the World 
Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), Lecocq and Capoor (2003) find that unclear signals about 
whether Kyoto will be ratified have put a damper on new projects as investors and potential users 
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of credits are waiting to see how things develop. Lead times for greenhouse gas mitigation 
projects can be from three to seven years, depending on the type of technology and the business 
environment of the host country. They note that for new projects to deliver significant emission 
credits by 2012, contracts should be signed by 2006 at the latest and conclude: 
Apart from ratification, lead-time is probably the single most important issue JI and CDM 
faces in the medium-term. Absent some clarification of the validity of project-based ERs 
[emissions reductions] beyond 2012, volumes transacted under these mechanisms might 
diminish sharply before the beginning of the first commitment period. 
Moreover, it is not clear that the process to review and approve CDM projects would be 
capable of handling the necessary number of projects, even if there were enough in the pipeline. 
Although the CDM Executive Board hopes to further standardize methodologies in the future, 
the current process is a “bottom up” collection of project specific methodologies. Thus far, 11 
methodologies have been approved but no projects have made it through the process. Some 
analysts have questioned whether this “case law” approach to methodology development will be 
effective in the long run (Trexler et al. 2003), or whether it will successfully lead to standardized 
baseline methodologies (Jepma, 2003). 
To get a sense of the number of projects that will have to pass through the process, we 
calculated a rough “typical size” of a project based on the first 11 projects to have approved 
methodologies by the CDM methodologies panel (see Table 5). At an average sized project of 
400,000 tons, there would have to be nearly 520 projects to satisfy EU demand and a total of 
nearly 1,070 to satisfy worldwide demand.26  
Banking. There are questions about whether the EU system will have enough liquidity, 
particularly in the beginning years, to avoid price shocks from unexpected events such as severe 
weather. U.S. experience has shown that in properly designed programs, a banking provision can 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 Figure 3 does not include Germany and three other Member States who did not report their projected transport 
emissions for the EEA study. 
26 In fact, some greenhouse gas experts believe that the size of a “typical” project will be smaller than 400,000 
MtCO2e. A more realistic “typical” project may generate between 250,000 and 300,000 MtCO2e per year 
(Youngman, 2004). Using 250,000 MtCO2e as a lower bound, there would have to be 832 projects to satisfy EU 
demand and 1,712 to meet worldwide demand for GHG credits. 
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create a cushion that will prevent spikes in price and can hedge uncertainty in allowance prices 
(Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004). 
 Between the first two periods, the EU allows each Member State to decide whether it 
will allow banking. The Directive states that each Member States must cancel extra allowances 
at the end of the first period, but may then “reissue” these allowances as banked allowances (EC, 
2003c). Because banking is not universally required, it is unclear how Member States will react 
to this provision. Some Member States may be concerned that use of banked allowances may 
make it more difficult to meet the Kyoto target. For example, the U.K.’s draft National 
Allocation Plan would prohibit banking between Phase I and Phase II of the program. On the 
other hand, if any single Member State allows unlimited banking, then the fungibility of 
allowances suggests that market participants will attempt to funnel as much banking as possible 
through that country’s program.27 In any case, banking and some borrowing are allowed within 
each compliance phase, and a banking provision would be mandatory for Member States 
between Phase II and any subsequent period (DEFRA, 2004a).  
Delays in Entering the Program. A second question about the EU program is whether 
key participants will delay entering the program. Delayed entry could have both positive and 
negative effects on prices, depending on whether the Member State entering is a net buyer or 
seller. For example, a delay by one of the larger Accession Countries might have a short-term 
impact on prices. According to the POLES analysis, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary would provide 36 MtCO2e from the trading sectors to the market in 2010. According to 
the EU’s analysis, this represents approximately 70% of the supply of tons from the trading 
sectors within the 25 EU countries (Criqui and Kitous, 2003).28  
Conversely, a delay in entry of a net buyer could dampen the price of allowances. For 
example, some of the fast-growing, southern tier countries such as Spain will need to be heavy 
                                                 
27 Thus far, only France has indicated that it might allow banking from the first to the second phase (Zapfel, 2004). 
28 Because of the way countries are grouped in the POLES model 12 MtCO2e of supply are shown to come from the 
Annex B countries in the “Rest of Central Europe.” Thus, some of these tons may come from countries like 
Bulgaria, which are not among the 10 Accession Countries joining the EU in May 2004. 
  33   Resources for the Future  Kruger and Pizer 
buyers of allowances in the EU market. According to the POLES analysis, Spain is estimated to 
purchase 34 million tons of carbon dioxide for use by their emissions trading sectors. Thus, if 
there is a delay in participation in the program by Spain or other net buyers, this could have a 
short-term dampening effect on allowance prices. 
Russian tons. Finally, the availability of Russian tons is still a question. Although the 
POLES analysis does not model Russia separately, it does model collectively countries in Annex 
B from the former Soviet Union. As stated previously, the analysis only allows for JI credits,  
not excess Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) resulting from the collapse of the Russian economy 
and the subsequent reduction in emissions after the 1990 base year. Given this restriction, 
countries of the former Soviet Union are expected to provide only 45 million tons of carbon 
dioxide to the market. On the other hand, full inclusion of Russian “hot air” could have a large 
impact on world prices of allowances and, indirectly, on the costs of compliance with the EU 
ETS (Bernard, et al., 2003). 29  
4.4  Efficiency Suggestions from Theory 
All of the aforementioned uncertainty—program features, technology and behavioral 
response, and external events—indicates that the market could be quite volatile. Experience in 
the U.S. NOx RECLAIM and OTC markets, for example, shows that prices can jump by many 
orders of magnitude in response to various shocks. Figures 4 and 5 show the path of these prices. 
In the case of the RECLAIM market, the California energy crisis during the fall of 2000 created 
a spike in demand for generation in the Los Angeles basin, which unfortunately coincided with 
already relatively tight NO x allowance markets. The result was allowance prices jumping from 
hundreds or perhaps a few thousand dollars per ton to more than $90,000 per ton. Meanwhile, in 
the OTC NO x market, uncertainty about allocation and participation in advance of the program 
                                                 
29 Although Russian AAUs could not be used directly in the EU ETS, they could affect EU allowance prices in two 
ways. First, a Member State government could purchase AAUs for Kyoto compliance rather than imposing a lower 
cap on sources covered by the EU ETS. Second, large quantities of Russian AAUs would expand the overall supply 
of greenhouse credits and could subsequently depress prices of CDM credits. Under the proposed linking directive, 
CDM credits would be directly convertible to EU allowances. 
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start date caused a significant run up in prices from roughly $1,000 per ton to more than $6,000 
per ton. Once rules were finalized—less than six months before the season began—and once 
participation was clear (Maryland’s participation, for example, was held up by a legal challenge), 
pressure eased and prices dropped dramatically to levels below $1,000 per ton (Burtraw and 
Evans, 2003). 
While both the NO x OTC and RECLAIM markets differ from the proposed EU ETS in 
many important ways—perhaps most importantly smaller size—the risks are qualitatively if not 
quantitatively the same. Namely, a shortage can lead to spikes in the price of allowances. The 
question for a larger market is whether shocks are likely to be idiosyncratic, with one source’s 
higher demand cancelled out by another source’s lower demand, or whether shocks are likely to 
be common, with higher demand occurring across a great number of sources at the same time. 
Crude data on annual emission fluctuations at the national level suggests that variation of several 
percentage points is common (Pizer, 2003). Even absent real shocks, shifts in expectations can 
have large, system-wide effects (as in the OTC market). What remains to be seen is how easily 
marginal mitigation opportunities can absorb such shocks. 
In any case, volatility is costly. On the one hand, firms can choose to insulate themselves 
from volatility by using derivative markets—options and futures contracts—to hedge or fix their 
cost. There are premiums involved in such exercises, however, because there is real risk. In 
response to shocks, someone, somewhere will have to adjust their emissions away from their 
planned level. It is those adjustments that will drive the market price of allowances and will 
represent the cost to society, on the margin of adjusting those emissions. 
Meanwhile, one can ask the question: does it make sense to spend a large amount of 
resources—$90,000 per ton in the case of NOx RECLAIM or $6,000 per ton in the case of NOx 
OTC—to meet an emissions target. If emissions targets are designed to avoid a precipitous 
damage threshold, the answer is undoubtedly yes. But if the emission target is meant to be a 
down payment on a much longer-term effort, the answer would seem to be no. This intuition, 
articulated first by Weitzman (1974) and then by others, suggests that strict emission limits are 
often undesirable—inefficient—when mitigation benefits (or emission damages) fail to be 
precipitous. 
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While not envisioned by the Directive in this way, the penalties included in the EU ETS 
could go a long way toward ameliorating these risks if the EC decided to encourage their use in a 
noncriminal manner.30 The initial penalty of €40 / tCO2—ton of carbon dioxide—is about three 
times the estimated price of €14 / tCO2. This could avoid the risk of the enormous price spikes 
noted in the two NOx programs by allowing firms to opt out and pay the penalty. At the same 
time, the penalty is high enough that prices can fluctuate quite a bit before it becomes relevant. 
Curiously, this factor of three between the expected price and the penalty is nearly identical to 
the factor used in the U.S. Clear Skies proposal.31  
The penalty in the second phase jumps to €100 / tCO2, or perhaps seven times the 
expected allowance price. Further, sources must pay the additional cost of purchasing offsets in 
the following year.32 Coupled with “naming and shaming” consequences associated with failing 
to hold the requisite emission allowances and the additional penalties that may be levied by 
Member States, it is questionable whether firms would intentionally choose this option. Still, any 
kind of cost limiting mechanism is better than none and the framework remains in place should 
the EU choose to revisit the question in the future.33  
5. Conclusions 
Without a doubt, the rapid launch of the first large-scale greenhouse gas trading program 
is an impressive political achievement. Many of the design elements of the program are sound, 
and the program clearly builds upon many of the lessons learned from earlier experience with 
emissions trading programs. On the other hand, with 25 countries, multiple industrial sectors, 
                                                 
30 A similar “decriminalization” of penalties was discussed in the National Academy study of the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy program in the U.S. (NRC 2002) 
31 Expected prices under Clear Skies are around $1,000-$1,500 per ton for NOx and SO2 with a safety valve at 
$4,000 per ton. See S. 1844, 108
th Congress. A penalty or safety valve, by cutting off price outcomes above the 
specified level, will tend to lower the expected price. Therefore, the penalty or safety valve price must be above the 
expected price—it is simply unclear how much above is desirable. 
32 Although the capacity to effectively borrow through a compliance phase means that this additional cost could be 
delayed until the end of the following phase. 
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and the mixture of a cap-and-trade structure with project-level offsets, the EU ETS has many 
new (and some old) issues to address. The timeframe for starting up the program is short, 
particularly considering the number of installations that will participate in the program and  
the lack of experience in most European countries with emissions trading. With the exception 
of emissions trading experiments in the United Kingdom and Denmark (for CO2) and Slovakia 
and the Netherlands (for NOx), most Member States are still coming up to speed on the 
fundamentals of emissions trading. This is significant because, as discussed in this paper, the  
EU ETS has a much more decentralized structure than previous multijurisdictional programs in 
the United States. 
Thus, there may be some bumps in the road as the EU goes through its “warm-up” phase 
starting in 2005. These may include delays by some Member States in meeting various deadlines, 
controversy over different Member State Allocation schemes, significant inconsistencies in 
compliance and enforcement provisions across Member States, and volatile allowance markets. 
EU officials have stated openly that they expect significant “learning by doing” in the initial 
years of the program (Runge-Metzger, 2003), and the EU Directive explicitly sets up a process 
that could result in recommendations for changes and fine tuning. In June 2006, the Commission 
will submit a report assessing key elements of the program and making recommendations for 
change. To the extent there is a rocky start to the program, this assessment of the first phase will 
undoubtedly be critical for turning the pilot phase into an effective program.  
The EU ETS represents a great opportunity, on the one hand, to set up the architecture 
and get moving toward a solution to the problem of global climate change. On the other hand, 
there are many potential pitfalls that could limit its effectiveness and, at worst, hurt future efforts 
to set up similar programs. We identified three major areas of concern: equity, enforcement, and 
efficiency. The biggest challenge facing the EU ETS in the first two areas is simply the 
heterogeneous, multijurisdictional nature of the European Union. Coupled with the particularly 
tight timetable, it is unclear what will happen as countries with weaker environmental 
                                                                                                                                                             
33 Pizer (2002) makes this point quantitatively—a safety valve many times higher than the desired price still 
dramatically raises expected welfare relative to the case where there is no safey valve. 
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institutions, both to allocate allowances and to enforce compliance, are brought into the program. 
Lessons from the U.S. programs indicate that even under the best of conditions, these things take 
time; therefore, the deadlines may need to be delayed for some or all countries. The main 
challenge regarding efficiency is to avoid the kinds of shortages and price spikes that have 
characterized some U.S. allowance markets. There is little in the science of climate change to 
suggest that short-term targets are worth an exorbitant expense when the real challenge is the 
long-term trend. The existing penalty provisions could be used to take a large step toward 
alleviating such risks, should Member States choose to do so. 
Besides the implementation challenges of the EU ETS, Members States face the daunting 
political and economic challenges of meeting their Kyoto burden-sharing targets. EU officials 
continue to express a strong commitment to the Kyoto process, and meeting the Kyoto targets 
has been a driving force behind the EU ETS. However, it is also clear that several aspects of the 
structure and process inherent in the Kyoto agreement discussed earlier in this paper will make it 
more difficult to implement the EU ETS. For example, the CDM Executive Board process could 
be a bottleneck for the project-level reductions that will help reduce costs in the EU system. The 
current directive also precludes linking the EU ETS to domestic trading programs of countries 
(such as the U.S. and Australia) who are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol.34 
In addition, concerns about meeting the Kyoto commitment could constrain banking from 
the first to the second compliance phase. This could also undermine longer-term mitigation plans 
because firms may have little incentive to implement strategies that create extra emissions 
reductions beyond their allocated levels. Although firms may trade excess allowances to other 
firms for use within the first compliance period, the inability to bank these “early reductions” 
could be a significant disincentive if prices are low in the first period and high in the second. 
Moreover, some firms may fear that reducing emissions beyond the levels of their allocations 
could lead to lower baselines (and allocations) in the second phase. Although procedures to 
                                                 
34 There have been proposals in the European Parliament to allow linking of the EU ETS to potential cap-and-trade 
programs from regional authorities in developed countries that have still to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This could 
include cap-and-trade programs developed by U.S. or Australian states. 
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provide “baseline protection” to prevent penalization for these extra reductions are possible, their 
credibility and practicality are unclear. Finally, the lack of a bank of allowances in the first phase 
forgoes a potentially strong political incentive for European companies to support the 
continuation of the program into the second phase—namely, the holding of a large and valuable 
portfolio of banked allowances 
A more fundamental difficulty raised by the Kyoto process is uncertainty about the form 
and level of international commitment beyond 2012. This will constrain EU Member States in 
planning for the next phase of the EU ETS. It also makes it difficult for European industry to 
take a long-term approach to investing in climate friendly technologies and to planning a least 
cost, longer-term strategy for GHG abatement. Moreover, although banking will be available 
between the second period and subsequent periods, uncertainty over the structure of a future 
international regime could make Member States and their industries reluctant to make the 
investment decisions that would enable them to take advantage of a banking provision.  
The ultimate challenge raised by Kyoto may be maintaining the political will in Europe to 
meet the Kyoto target. Concerns about the cost of meeting the target and the potential 
competitiveness disadvantage for Europe compared to the U.S. and other countries could make 
EU Member States reluctant to impose the necessary measures on industry. A recent study from 
the European Environmental Agency shows that even with projected new measures (excluding 
the EU ETS), the EU will miss its collective target. They highlight the transport sector as a 
source of emissions growth, suggesting that one of the most difficult decisions to be faced by the 
EU in the next few years will be how to address these emissions—whether through inclusion in 
the trading program when it revises the program in 2006, imposing a commensurate carbon tax, 
or some other sectoral policy. Without such policies, it will be difficult for the EU to meet its 
overall Kyoto target.35  
                                                 
35 This assumes that the EU does not allow the widespread use of Russian “hot air” or force all the reduction onto 
installations participating in the EU ETS. Even if unspecified “additional measures” are included in projections, the 
EEA (2003) study finds that there will be an increase of emissions in the transportation sector of greater than 20% 
by 2010 in the 11 Members States where projection data was available (see Figure 3).  
  39   Resources for the Future  Kruger and Pizer 
Finally, even if EU Member States are unable to meet their targets, or if Kyoto does not 
come into force, a functioning EU trading system could still be influential in future international 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. Ellerman (1998) notes that one of the biggest obstacles to an 
international trading system has been the lack of even a single national system that can create 
demand for emissions reductions. Once such a system is in place, an international system may 
evolve, more as a matter of trade than as an international agreement. Other observers have 
predicted that a post-Kyoto climate regime may consist of negotiated linkages among domestic 
programs, rather than the type of formal multilateral process embodied in the Kyoto Protocol 
(Purvis, 2003). To the extent that emissions trading plays a role in such evolving schemes, 
precedents set by the first large greenhouse gas trading program could be critical. Thus, with or 
without Kyoto, the stakes are high for Europe as it carries out its new, but much more difficult 
grand policy experiment. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Estimated Number of Installations in the EU ETS 
Country   Installations 
  
Austria   240 
Belgium   295 
Cyprus 15 
Czech Rep.  500 
Denmark   350 
Estonia   39 
Germany   2,600 
Greece   185 
Finland   500 
France   1,500 
Hungary   300 
Ireland   97 
Italy   1,900–2,100 
Latvia  86 
Lithuania   NA 
Luxembourg 12–19 
Malta   NA 
Netherlands 250–300 
Poland   1,100–1,200 
Portugal   200 
Slovakia   200 
Slovenia   70-100 
Spain   NA 
Sweden   500 
UK   1,500 
    
Total   12,439–12,826 
Source: European Commission, “National Allocation Plan Progress 
Table—8 March 2004” 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/pdf/nap_progress.pdf  
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Table 2: Comparison of Key Features of the EU ETS and U.S. Programs 
Features  U.S. SO2 Program  U.S. NOx Program  EU ETS 
Sectors Electric  Power 






Energy (including electric 
power, oil refineries, coke 
ovens) 
Metal ore, iron-and-steel 
production 
Minerals (including 
cement, lime, glass, 
ceramics) 
Pulp and paper 
Number of Regulated 
Sources 
3,000 units
a  2,400 12,000–13,000 
installations
b 
Number of Political 
Jurisdictions 
1 (U.S. Federal 
Govt.) 
22 (21 states and the 
District of Columbia) 
25 Member States 
Emissions Covered  SO2 NOx CO2, some or all of five 
other “Kyoto Gases” may 
be added later 
Project-Level Offsets?  No  No  Yes (proposed) 
Value of Annual 
Allocation 
$2.25 billion
c  $1.2 billion
d  $37 billion
e 
a A “unit” is defined in U.S. trading programs as a combustion boiler. Thus, a power plant with five distinct boilers 
would be considered five units under the U.S. SO2 and NOx programs. 
b The classification of a regulated source of emissions is different in the EU ETS than it is in the U.S. programs. An 
installation could consist of multiple sources of emissions that have a technical connection with the activities carried 
out at a site. For example, a power plant would be considered one installation, even though there are multiple boilers. 
c Assumes an annual allocation of 8.9 million tons and an allowance price of $250/ton. 
d Assumes an annual allocation of 500,000 tons and an allowance price of $2,400/ton. 
e Although the size of the EU ETS cap won’t be known until the National Allocation Plans for Phase II are final, 
Harrison and Radov (2002) cite an EU study that estimates an annual value of €30 billion ($37.5 billion) for 
allowances in the EU ETS.  
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Table 3: Comparison of Where Provisions are Implemented  
in U.S. and European Emissions Trading Programs 
Design Element  U.S. SO2  U.S. NOx  EU ETS 
Sectors  Covered  Centralized Centralized Centralized 
Size Threshold for 
Sources 
Centralized Centralized Centralized 
Sectoral Target 
Setting 
Centralized Centralized Decentralized  (with  guidance) 
Allocation to Firms  Centralized  Decentralized  Decentralized (with guidance) 
Banking   Centralized  Centralized  Decentralized (first compliance 
period); Centralized (second 
compliance period) 





Centralized Centralized Centralized 
Emissions Reporting 
Standards 
Centralized Centralized Centralized 
Emissions 
Verification 
Centralized Centralized Decentralized  (with  guidance) 
Excess Emissions 
Penalty 
Centralized Centralized Centralized 
Criminal and Civil 
Penalties 
Centralized Centralized Decentralized  (with  guidance) 
Dissemination of Data  Centralized  Centralized  Decentralized (with guidance) 
Key: 
Centralized=Decided at U.S. Federal/European Commission level 
Decentralized=Decided at U.S. State/EU Member State Level 
Decentralized with Guidance=Decided by EU Member States with European Commission guidance 
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Table 4:  EU ETS Costs in 2010 
Scenario 
2008–2012 
No Offsets  3% Limit on 
Offsets 
6% Limit on 
Offsets 
Unlimited Offsets 
Annual Costs  €2.9 billion  €2.8 billion  €2.4 billion  €2.2 billion 
Estimated 
Allowance Price 
€26/ton CO2e €20/ton  CO2e €14/ton  CO2e €13/ton  CO2e 
Amount of Offsets 
in the System 
NA 3% 6% 7% 
Annual EU 
Emissions 
4,664 MMTCO2e +171  MMTCO2e +208  MMTCO2e +224  MMTCO2e 
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Table 5:  Annual Tons from Projects with Approved CDM Methodologies  
Name    Country    Project    Annual Tons
El Gallo
  Mexico   Hydroelectric    70,484 
Onyx     Brazil   Landfill  Gas  90,075 
A.T.  Biopower  Thailand   Biomass   80,450 
Graneros     Chile   Fuel  Switch  16,063 
Durban     S. Africa    Landfill Gas  441,571 
Nova Gerar  S. Africa    Landfill Gas  197,213 
Vale de Rosario   Brazil    Cogeneration  134,015 
Ulsan HFC  S. Korea    HFC Destruction  1,400,000 
Salvador de Bahia  Brazil    Landfill Gas  825,139 
Lucknow   India   Landfill  Gas   88,017 
Rang Dong   Viet Nam   Oil Field Methane  1,220,000 
         
AVERAGE       414,821 
Annual tons reflect estimates for 2010 in the project documents that  
accompanied these methodologies.  In some cases, 2010 estimates were derived  
from overall emission reduction estimates for the life of the project.  Documentation 
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Source: EEA, 2003 
 
  47   Resources for the Future  Kruger and Pizer 













0 + 20 + 40 + 60 + 80 + 100 + 120 + 140 + 160 + 180 + 200
percent points change (decrease (-), increase (+))
2010 With measures projections
 
Source: EEA, 2003 
Note: EU-11 emission projections are presented only for those Member States that reported projections (B, D, DK, E, 
FIN, IRL, I, L, NL, S, UK). Emissions exclude international aviation and navigation. 
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Figure 4:  NOx RECLAIM Market Prices 
RECLAIM NOx Prices
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Figure 5: NOx OTC Market Prices 
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